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INTRODUCTION
There has been a significant decline in the share of 
wages in GDP in both developed and developing 
countries since the 1980s. This paper analyses the 
determinants of the wage share (labour compensation 
as a ratio to value added) for the 1970–2011 period 
using sectoral data with country specific estimations 
for six OECD countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Britain, and the United States.
There are two main hypotheses put forward to 
explain the decline in the wage share: the technological 
change hypothesis posits that the labour share declined 
due to capital augmenting technological change or an 
increase in the capital intensity of production. The 
bargaining power hypothesis attributes the decline in 
the labour share to a decline in the bargaining power 
of labour, induced by changes in government policy, 
labour market institutions or financialisation. We 
argue that the relevance of these factors differs across 
countries along three lines:
1. The relevance of labour market institutions 
depends on the bargaining regime. For example, 
union density is likely to be particularly relevant 
in countries with highly coordinated bargaining 
regimes, whereas bargaining coverage and social 
government expenditure is potentially more 
relevant in a decentralised bargaining environment.
2. The effect of globalisation on the wage share 
depends on whether market or cost seeking 
activities dominate, which is likely to differ by 
country and industry group.
3. The effect of technology might differ depending on 
the production structure in the economy, the type 
of goods the country specialises in, as well as across 
high- and low-skilled sectors.
Previous research either focuses on one individual 
country or uses panel data that pools countries, which 
does not offer a satisfactory account for country-
specific differences. Our contribution consists in 
providing country-specific estimations using an 
industry-level dataset for the largest economies in 
the EU and the United States. Our sample allows to 
assess how the effect of labour market institutions 
on the wage share depends on the underlying 
bargaining regime. Furthermore, while industry level 
data on FDI or intermediate imports does not allow 
for a differentiation between market or cost seeking 
activities, we can analyse whether trade in a particular 
country is more of a market seeking or cost seeking 
nature by conducting country-specific estimations.2
Previous contributions mainly focus on either 
the technological change or the bargaining power 
hypothesis. The previous research focusing on the 
impact of bargaining power on the wage share uses 
mostly aggregate country level panel data, which 
does not differentiate the results across skill groups 
and industries (ILO 2011; Jayadev 2007; Kristal 2010; 
Onaran 2009; Stockhammer 2009 and 2017). Within 
the literature that argues the primacy of technological 
change, Bassanini and Manfredi (2014), Karabarbounis 
and Neiman (2014), and IMF (2017) use industry as well 
as country panel data; however they barely control for 
variables reflecting the bargaining power of labour and 
labour market institutions, welfare state retrenchment 
or financialisation.3 Guschanski and Onaran (2017a, 
2017b and 2018) provide a comprehensive analysis 
of both hypotheses. However, they pool countries 
(Guschanski and Onaran 2017a and 2017b), or use 
firm-level data (Guschanski and Onaran 2018). Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), and Onaran (2011 and 2012) 
are closest to our analysis, but while these studies 
focus on a single country, the United States and Austria 
respectively, we perform our analysis for six OECD 
countries, control more thoroughly for measures of 
technological change and incorporate a broader range 
of explanatory variables.
Our findings provide new insights regarding the 
drivers of the falling wage share. We confirm previous 
research based on the analysis of country-level 
panel data attributing the decline in the wage share 
to a decline in bargaining power of labour driven by 
changes in labour market institutions, financialisation 
and globalisation. However, we find that these factors 
impact countries and skill groups within countries 
differently, thereby confirming the upmost relevance 
of country specific institutional setting in determining 
income distribution. Specifically, we find that union 
density is the most relevant measure of the bargaining 
power of labour in highly coordinated bargaining 
2 Furthermore, while country-level analysis always faces the ques-
tion as to whether the decline in the wage share captures changes 
in the sectoral composition rather than a decline of the wage share 
within sectors, we are able to isolate the within sector development 
of the wage share, while abstracting from changes in the sectoral 
composition. Indeed, we find that the wage share declined within 
the large majority of industries in our sample, including within high- 
and low-skilled sectors. This confirms previous findings by Kara-
barbounis and Neiman (2014); and Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010), 
attributing the decline in the wage share mainly to within-industry 
changes.
3 IMF (2017) controls for union density, employment protection 
legislation and corporate taxation at the country level in some sec-
tor level estimations for different skill groups, while Bentolila and 
Saint-Paul (2003) control for the strike rate at the country level.
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regimes (Germany, Italy, 
Spain), while collective bar-
gaining coverage and social 
government spending is 
more important in countries 
where firm-level bargaining 
dominates (France, Britain, the 
United States). Financialisation 
reduced the bargaining power 
of labour mainly in Britain and 
the United States, and to some 
extent in Germany. Different 
measures of globalisation had 
an impact on the wage share 
in all countries. Although 
we also find some evidence for a negative impact of 
technological change in the United States, Italy and 
Spain, our results indicate that the decline in the wage 
share is not an inevitable outcome of technological 
progress. Rather, reversing the decline in the wage 
share requires institutional changes that bring the 
bargaining power of labour more in balance with that 
of capital.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
The second section provides a review of the literature 
on the determinants of functional income distribution, 
as well as some stylised facts on the countries in 
our sample. The third section outlines our empirical 
strategy, followed by the fourth section which presents 
the estimation results. The final section concludes.
WHAT DRIVES THE DECLINE IN THE WAGE SHARE?
The Technological Change Hypothesis
The technological change hypothesis posits that the 
labour share declined due to capital augmenting 
technological change or an increase in the capital-
output ratio. Several studies argue that technological 
progress was capital augmenting since the 1980s 
(Bassanini and Manfredi 2014; European Commission 
2007). This increases the amount of output that can be 
produced from a given unit of capital and can have a 
negative impact on the labour share. A related stream 
of literature argues that technological progress in the 
last four decades contributed to a decline in the price 
of capital relative to labour. If firms are optimising, 
this will lead to a substitution of capital for labour and 
an increase in the capital-output ratio, referred to as 
‘capital intensity’ (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014). 
However, the effect of these two variables on the 
labour share depends on the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour. More precisely, the 
necessary assumption for a negative effect of capital 
augmenting technological change and capital intensity 
on the labour share is that the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour is larger than one (Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul 2003). We obtain the cases shown in 
Table 1.
It is usually assumed that capital is a substitute 
for low-skilled labour, whereas it complements high-
skilled labour – therefore we expect a negative effect in 
the former and a positive effect in the latter case. 
The ratio of capital to value added, often 
differentiated by ICT and non-ICT capital, is usually 
applied as a measure of technological change in the 
literature. Most prominently, Karabarbounis and 
Neiman (2014) provide evidence for a negative effect of 
technological change on the wage share and increasing 
capital intensity worldwide, implying an elasticity of 
substitution above one. According to their estimations, 
about half of the global decline in the labour share can 
be explained by a reduction in the relative price of capi- 
tal. Similarly, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), and 
Bassanini and Manfredi (2014) obtain significant 
negative effects of capital intensity as well as total factor 
productivity (used as a proxy for capital augmenting 
technological change) in OECD countries, again imply- 
ing an elasticity of substitution larger than one. IMF 
(2017) fail to find a significant effect of the relative 
price of investment on the wage share for tradable 
sectors, while there is some evidence for a negative 
effect in non-tradable sectors with a high initial ex- 
posure to routinisation. In contrast, analyses by 
Elsby et al. (2012), Harrison (2002), ILO (2011) and 
Stockhammer (2009 and 2017) find none or a positive 
effect of capital intensity, implying an elasticity 
of substitution that is below or equal to one. This 
is supported by studies whose primary focus lies 
on the estimation of the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour – the majority of these 
analyses consistently find values below one and 
closer to 0.4 (Chirinko 2008; Chirinko and Mallick 
2014; Rowthorn 2014). The value of the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour is one of the 
most contested topics in economic research. However, 
there is relatively little research on the determinants 
of this parameter.4 Usually, the elasticity is assumed 
to be given by technology and only subject to change 
4 IMF (2017) propose a model, where globalisation leads to offshor-
ing of goods with a low elasticity of substitution from advanced to 
emerging economies, thereby increasing the share of tasks with low 
elasticity of substitution in emerging economies.
Table 1 
 
 
 
Different Elasticities of Substitution between Capital and Labour and the Effect of 
Technological Change on the Labour Share 
Elasticity of 
substitution 
Effect of capital intensity and capi-
tal augmenting technological 
change on the wage share 
Description 
> 1 < 0 K and L are strong substitutes  technological change has a 
negative impact = 1 = 0 Unitary elasticity (Cobb-Doug-las production)  no impact 
of technological change < 1 > 0 K and L are weak substitutes  technological change has a 
positive impact 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
 
Table 1
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over the very long run. Since the determinants of 
the elasticity of substitution are largely unobservable 
as well as task-specific, it is not possible to formu- 
late a hypothesis about the effect of capital inten- 
sity on the labour share in a particular country 
or industry a priori. In general, we expect a nega- 
tive effect to be more likely in low-skill indus- 
tries, whereas the effect should be positive in high-
skilled industries, if these classifications accurately 
represent the skill-level of the representative task in 
the industry.5
We could also observe a negative relation between 
capital intensity and the wage share that has nothing to 
do with substitution of capital for labour. For example, 
if firms set prices to achieve a certain target profit rate 
an increase in the capital stock will be associated with 
a higher mark-up to increase profits and keep the profit 
rate constant (Lavoie 2014).6 
5 A specific hypothesis suggesting a negative impact of technolog-
ical change on medium-skilled workers is put forward by the liter-
ature on job polarization. According to this research, technological 
progress in the last decades was driven by Information and Com-
munication Technology (ICT), that allowed to replace workers by 
machines for tasks that are easily automatized, which were mainly 
performed by medium-skilled workers (Autor and Dorn 2013; Goos 
et al. 2014; IMF 2017). As we apply a binary sectoral classification, 
this implies that some sectors classified as high-skilled might also be 
negatively affected by technological change.
6 To be precise, it would be a negative relation between the wage 
share and the capital stock to normal output level, i.e. the output 
level firms expect to sell which may be below the full-capacity out-
put level.
We observe a steady increase in the share of ICT 
capital to value added across all sectors and countries 
in our sample.7 There is a slight bias in favour of high 
skilled sectors in Britain and the United States, but 
the general positive and sometimes even exponential 
trend is common to all countries. In contrast, total 
capital intensity, while increasing in Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain, was largely stable in the United States 
and Britain.
The Bargaining Power Hypothesis
The bargaining power hypothesis attributes 
the decline in the wage share to a decline in the 
bargaining power of labour. If markets are not fully 
competitive, i.e. there is market power in the labour 
market and potentially the goods market, bargaining 
power between capital and labour determines factor 
income distribution (besides capital intensity and 
capital augmenting technological change). In models 
of bargaining power, capital and labour bargain for 
wages and potentially employment. Both parties have 
an interest in concluding the negotiations and the 
split of the value added depends on their respective 
fall-back options. The literature distinguishes 
three main factors determining bargaining power 
7 Descriptive statistics are available upon request from the authors: 
see also Guschanski and Onaran (2016).
56
60
64
68
72
76
0
20
40
60
80
100
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
UK USA
Source: Visser (2015); EU KLEMS (Timmer et al. 2007). © ifo Institute 
% %
60
64
68
72
76
80
0
20
40
60
80
100
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Spain France
%%
60
64
68
72
76
80
0
20
40
60
80
100
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Union density Bargaining coverage
Changes in the Wage Share and Diﬀerent Bargaining Regimes
1970–2011
Germany Italy
Wage share
% %
Figure 1
47
FOCUS
CESifo Forum 2/ 2018 June Volume 19
– labour market institutions, financialisation and 
globalisation.
a) Labour Market Institutions
The traditional focus of bargaining power models are 
labour market institutions (Blanchard and Giavazzi 
2003). Measures of bargaining power related to labour 
market institutions can be categorised into direct and 
indirect factors. Direct factors strengthen workers’ 
voice in negotiations, whereas indirect factors 
improve their fall-back options in case negotiations 
break down. An example of indirect factors is 
unemployment benefits. A similar effect can be 
expected from welfare services provided by the state 
which allow workers to rely on the fall-back option of a 
social wage to meet their basic needs in case of losing 
their job (Stockhammer 2017; Onaran 2009; Jayadev 
2007; Harrison 2002). Direct measures of bargaining 
power include union density, strike activity, collective 
bargaining arrangements and minimum wages. 
Different measures of direct bargaining power might 
be relevant depending on the bargaining regime. We 
differentiate regimes by their level of union density, 
collective bargaining coverage and by the degree of 
bargaining coordination, i.e. whether bargaining takes 
place at the firm, industry or national level. Table 2 
provides a summary of the degree of coordination 
for our sample, while Figure 1 demonstrates the 
development of union density, collective bargaining 
coverage and the wage share. 
Highly coordinated regimes where bargaining 
takes place at the industry or national level are usually 
characterised by a high degree of bargaining coverage. 
In such a setting, union density might be the most 
relevant variable for the determination of functional 
income distribution, as it captures the potential 
pressure unions can exert on employers (Visser 
2006). If unions achieve their goals, agreements are 
implemented at the industry level. Examples include 
Italy and Germany, which experienced a decline in 
union density while maintaining a relatively high level 
of collective bargaining coverage and a high degree 
of coordination. Union density stagnated or even 
increased in Spain between 1980 and 2010, however not 
exceeding the comparatively low level of 20 percent, 
while collective bargaining coverage remained high.8 
In contrast, in decentralised regimes unions might be 
less effective in pushing labours’ interests, because 
wage increases at the firm level are not automatically 
transferred to the wider work force.9 Britain and 
the United States are prime examples of such insti- 
tutional settings. In these cases, collective bargaining 
coverage might be more relevant, as it captures 
the effectiveness of unions in pushing for higher 
wages and defending employment on a wider 
scale (i.e. industry or country level). France is a 
special case characterised by a high degree of 
bargaining coverage, coupled with a low level of 
union density and a low degree of coordination. In 
this context, small unions can be very effective in 
improving the wage share due to the high level of 
collective bargaining coverage. However, due to the 
low degree of coordination, unions might not be able 
to take potential negative employment effects into 
account. Therefore, it is not clear which variable is 
best suited to capture changes in bargaining power in 
France a priori.
Comparing the dynamics of these labour market 
institutions across countries reveals that union density 
measured at the country level decline most strongly in 
Britain and Germany where the reduction constitutes 
24 and 18 percentage-points respectively. The most 
drastic reductions in bargaining coverage can be 
observed in Britain, Germany and the United States 
8 Since the increasing trend of union density in Spain can be at-
tributed to a period of recovery after oppressed labour unions after 
Franco, we regard it as a special case. 
9 Conversely, it has been argued that a high degree of coordination 
allows wage suppression with potentially negative effects on the 
labour share (OECD 2012).Table 2 
 
 
 
The Degree of Coordination in Bargaining 
 Degree of coordination Hypothesis: most relevant measure of direct bargaining power 
Germany 3 1964–65; 1968–77; 1998–2001 Union density 4 1960–63; 1966–67; 1978–97; 2002–11 
France 2 1961–2011 Union density or bargaining coverage 
Spain 
2 1987–2001 
Union density 3 2008–11 
4 1980–86; 2002–08 
Italy 
2 1960–76; 1985–1991 
Union density 3 1992–2011 
4 1977–84 
UK 
1 1980–2011 
Bargaining coverage 3 1961–74 
4 1975–79 
US 1 1960-2011 Bargaining coverage 
Notes: Degree of coordination: 1 – Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants; 2 – Mixed industry and firm-level bargaining, weak 
government coordination through MW setting or wage indexation; 3 – Negotiation guidelines based on centralized bargaining; 4 – Wage norms based on centralized 
bargaining by peak associations with or without government involvement; 5 – Maximum or minimum wage rates/increases based on centralized bargaining. 
Source: Visser (2015). 
 
Table 2
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where it declined by 48, 27 and 18 percentage-points 
between the 1970 and the 2010s.
Several empirical papers have confirmed an 
impact of direct measures of bargaining power, such 
as strike activity, collective bargaining arrangements 
and minimum wages on the wage share (Kristal 2010; 
Argitis and Pitelis 2001; Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
2003; European Commission 2007; ILO 2011). Union 
density is the most commonly used variable with the 
best data availability and the most robust positive 
effect on the wage share in country level estimations 
(Stockhammer 2009 and 2017; ILO 2011). In contrast, 
IMF (2007 and 2017) and European Commission (2007) 
find no significant effect of union density in most 
specifications.
Among indirect measures of bargaining power, 
welfare state retrenchment is found to be an important 
determinant of the fall in the wage share (Harridon 
2002; Jayadev 2007; Onaran 2009; Stockhammer 
2017). However, the measure used is often aggregate 
government spending. Kristal (2010) uses government 
civilian spending, which nevertheless does not capture 
the details of spending that is particularly important 
for the social wage and bargaining power of labour 
such as in-kind benefits and cash transfers.
Social government expenditure, defined as 
government spending on market goods and services 
provided to households such as health care, housing, 
recreational and cultural services, education and 
social protection, can be used as a proxy for the social 
wage of workers. We observe an increase in social 
government spending in our sample period in most 
countries. However, the trend might be related to the 
fact this measure excludes social transfers in cash 
(reflecting welfare benefits), which are not available 
prior to 1995.10 Interestingly, while social government 
spending increased or stagnated, its financing is 
more reliant on workers’ income as can be observed 
by the increasing implicit tax rates for labour and 
consumption for all countries in our sample (Onaran 
and Bösch 2014).
b) Financialisation
This paper addresses financialisation as an 
important determinant of bargaining power, which 
gained momentum since the 1980s and received 
only limited attention in the literature on functional 
income distribution. Financialisation is not 
unambiguously defined but can be understood as 
the “increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions 
in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies” (Epstein 2005, 3). We outline three sub-
channels via which financialisation can impact the 
wage share.
10 Social transfers were added to the previous measure for robust-
ness tests, but unfortunately the latter series is available from 1995 
only for most countries.
The first channel highlights that managers, 
motivated by shareholder value maximisation, 
adopted a corporate governance strategy that is 
hostile towards wage increases and prioritises 
dividend pay-outs and share buybacks (Lazonick 
2014). Similarly, shareholder value orientation 
coincided with increasing financial payments, such 
as dividend payments to satisfy shareholders, 
or interest payments on debt (Hein 2015; 
Dünhaupt 2016). Rather than accepting profit 
cuts, managers shifted the burden of increased 
financial payments on consumers by increasing 
the mark-up on production costs, with negative 
impacts on the wage share. This argument has 
motivated four econometric studies that found a 
negative impact of dividend and interest payments 
on the wage share, although the effect of interest 
payments is less robust (Dünhaupt 2016; Guschanski 
and Onaran 2018; Hein and Schoder 2011; Kohler et al. 
2018; Alvarez 2015).
The second channel highlights that fall-back 
options of capital increased due to the possibility 
to invest in financial assets rather than productive 
activities. This will lead to an increase in the relative 
bargaining power of capital. Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey (2013) and Alvarez (2015) investigate this 
hypothesis using US sector-level and French firm-
level data respectively. Both find a negative effect of 
financial income on the wage share, while controlling 
for variables measuring technological change and 
globalisation. In contrast, Kohler et al. (2018) find 
no effect of financial income in a panel of 14 OECD 
countries. Several studies based on country-level data 
find a negative effect of financial globalisation on the 
labour share, which can be considered an alternative 
measure of this variable (Jayadev 2007; Stockhammer 
2009 and 2017; ILO 2011).
The third channel emphasises household 
indebtedness. Household debt has been argued to 
reduce the wage share through increasing financial 
vulnerability that has an adverse effect on workers’ 
willingness to engage in collective action (Anderloni 
et al. 2012; Kohler et al. 2018; Wood 2017). Wood (2017) 
finds a negative effect of mortgage debt in Britain and 
the United States for the period 1979–2012.
To test these three channels, we employ three 
measures of financialisation: financial payments (the 
sum of interest and dividend payments) and financial 
income of nonfinancial corporations as a ratio to total 
resources of nonfinancial corporations obtained from 
the OECD Non-financial Accounts by Sectors Database. 
Furthermore, we augment our analysis by a measure of 
household debt as a percentage of GDP from the Bank 
of International Settlements Total Credit Statistics. 
All measures show an overall increasing trend in the 
2000s,11 which is interrupted only by the Great 
11 Household debt has been increasing in our sample since the 
1970s. For other variables availability data starts in the late 1990s or 
early 2000s.
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Recession, after which most measures decline 
until 2011.
Globalisation 
Globalisation plays a dual role – on the one hand 
it increases the bargaining power of capital due to 
increased mobility and ease of offshoring or relocation, 
on the other hand it can lead to changes in capital 
intensity or induce technological change. The increase 
in capital intensity will be driven by globalisation if firms 
in capital abundant countries offshore labour-intensive 
tasks to benefit from lower wages in labour abundant 
countries (IMF 2017; Elsby et al. 2013). This mechanism 
should be reflected in changes in capital intensity – 
consequently, it is not possible to identify whether the 
effect of capital intensity stems from technological 
change or globalisation. In contrast, trade induced 
capital-augmenting technological change as well as 
changes in bargaining power due to globalisation 
will change the wage share for a given level of capital 
intensity. Therefore, technology and bargaining power 
effect of globalisation cannot be separated in our 
empirical framework.
Two tendencies characterising advanced 
economies in the past decades were the increase in 
offshoring and FDI. We expect a negative effect of 
offshoring on the within-industry wage share for low 
skilled sectors in advanced economies, brought about 
either by downward pressure on wages to maintain 
competitiveness or through trade-induced labour-
saving technological change (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg 2006; Onaran 2011). The expected effect 
for high skilled sectors is more ambiguous, given that 
imports can also increase output and consequently 
labour demand and wages if they are complementary 
to domestic production or reduce costs. The effect is 
theoretically even more ambiguous if one considers 
imports of final goods that are not produced 
domestically (Onaran 2011). 
We generally expect the effect of outward FDI to 
vary across manufacturing and services and potentially 
across skill groups. FDI is generally classified into 
two categories: vertical or cost-seeking FDI induces 
downward pressure on wages as it puts domestic 
workers in direct competition with foreign workers 
(Choi 2001). Additionally, cost-seeking FDI might have 
an impact on the factor composition since the type 
of jobs created abroad are potentially of a low skilled 
nature, whereas high-skilled jobs might be created 
domestically. This can lower wages of low-skilled 
domestic workers while increasing those of high-skilled 
workers. The effect of horizontal, or market-seeking FDI 
on the wage share is less clear. Most likely it will have a 
positive impact for high skilled workers because of an 
increase in labour demand at headquarters situated in 
the home country (Onaran 2012). Generally, we expect 
these effects to be less pronounced in services because 
of their non-tradable character. Whether market or 
cost-seeking FDI dominates in a particular country or 
industry remains an empirical question. Herger and 
McCorriston (2014) rely on firm-level data to show that 
the share of vertical FDI is between 26–30 percent of all 
FDI in France, Germany, Britain and the United States. 
The lowest share of vertical FDI can be found in Britain 
and France (26 percent), while the highest share is in 
the United States (30 percent).12 Depending on the 
industries affected, the impact of FDI on the wage share 
might therefore differ by country.
Several empirical studies find substantial negative 
effects of variables measuring trade intensity (imports 
plus exports as a ratio to GDP), foreign direct investment 
(FDI) or offshoring, in line with the hypothesis that 
trade liberalisation increases the fall-back options of 
capital (Harrison 2002; European Commission 2007; 
IMF 2007; Jayadev 2007; Dünhaupt 2016; Stockhammer 
2017). Research using sector level data finds negative 
effects of import penetration in high wage countries, 
while there are mixed results for FDI (Bassanini and 
Manfredi 2014; IMF 2017; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 
2013; Onaran 2011 and 2012).
Variables accounting for globalisation show a 
similar pattern across all countries of our sample. 
Intermediate import penetration increased in all 
countries in both high and low skilled manufacturing 
sectors. The years of the crisis and shortly afterwards 
are the only exception to the otherwise increasing 
trend, which resumed at the latest in 2010 in all 
countries.13 The highest total growth rate was 
achieved in the 1990s in Germany, driven by high 
skilled manufacturing sectors, which in general have 
a higher level of intermediate imports than low skilled 
manufacturing sectors. A similar pattern can be 
observed for outward FDI. Outward FDI per employee 
increased more in high-skilled manufacturing 
and service sectors rather than their low-skilled 
counterparts in France, Germany and the United States, 
while the other countries experienced a rather balanced 
increase in outward FDI across sectors. The exceptions 
are low-skilled service sectors, which experience the 
least amount of outward FDI in all countries. 
While offshoring and FDI capture the increasing 
mobility of capital, migration allows us to account for 
the mobility of labour. Previous findings suggest the 
effect of migration on the wage share to be negligible 
(IMF 2007). Theoretically, the effect depends on 
whether migrant labour both substitutes the domestic 
workers and pushes down wages or acts as a 
complement to labour being performed locally, rather 
than a direct competitor. Previous research has shown 
that migration is related to increased innovation, 
measured by the registration of patents, and is there- 
fore potentially positively linked to productivity, with 
the subsequent effects discussed above (see Hunt 
and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010, for the United States; 
12 They do not report data for Spain and Italy.
13 These years are the reason why several countries have a negative 
growth rate for the last period.
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and Rolfe et al. 2013, for Britain; in general results 
appear to be country specific). Turning to the effect 
on employment, migrants often bring in knowledge 
about markets and economies of their home countries 
and therefore open the possibility for expansion of 
the business activities via new export markets, which 
might have a positive impact on the wage share (Huber 
et al. 2010; Rolfe et al. 2013). Conversely, if unions and 
other institutions protecting labour rights are weak 
and migrants are paid lower wages than nationals, the 
impact on the wage share will be negative.
The share of migrant workers in the total labour 
force has been increasing in most countries with the 
noticeable exception of France where it declined. 
Nevertheless, the share of migrants is very small in 
all countries, exceeding ten percent only the United 
States, where the data is not comparable because it is 
measured as foreign-born rather than foreign labour 
force.
MODEL AND ESTIMATION METHOD
Our basic estimation equation has the following form: 
(1)    
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where i is the sector index and t is the time index. 
These estimations are conducted for each country 
separately. WS is the wage share in sector i from the 
EU KLEMS database (Timmer et al. 2007).14 Income 
of self-employed workers is imputed based on the 
assumption that their wage is equal to the average 
hourly wage of the sector. GROWTH is the growth of the 
value added of the sector. It is included to control for 
the counter-cyclical dynamics of the wage share due 
to the existence of overhead costs. KICT and KnonICT 
are ICT (information and communication technology) 
and non-ICT capital services as a ratio to value added; 
these capture the effects of technological change. 
GLOBAL stands for intermediate import penetration 
(capturing offshoring15), outward FDI intensity16 and 
the share of migrant workers in total employment. 
LMI captures different labour market institutions 
14 Further information on data sources is available upon request 
from the authors.
15 However, our data for intermediate imports is based on the con-
version of commodity indices to sector indices and thereby does not 
allow us to calculate how much of the imported product is actually 
used by each sector, which requires the use of Input-Output tables 
(Guschanski and Onaran 2017). However, if the use of imported 
goods stays relatively constant across sectors, intermediate import 
penetration is a relevant measure for the reallocation of production 
abroad.
16 We focus on outward FDI since it is clearly linked to developments 
in the wage share while the effect of inward FDI is more ambiguous, 
and less relevant for developed economies. Furthermore, estimations 
with inward FDI did not change our results for outward FDI and the 
coefficient was not robust. Furthermore, we test the robustness of 
our results with regard to globalisation with country-level variables 
like the KOF index supplied by Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). 
These controls, which are important because the variable constitutes 
an exogenous measure of globalisation, strongly confirm our results 
with sector level variables. Results available upon request.
including union density (at the sector level) and 
adjusted collective bargaining coverage at the country 
level. FINANCIALISATION includes interest and dividend 
payments and income as a ratio to total resources of 
nonfinancial corporations, as well as household debt 
as a ratio to GDP at the country level. WELFARE is social 
government expenditure measured at the country 
level. ai is a sector specific coefficient. We do not 
include period effects in our baseline estimation since 
several of our bargaining variables are only available at 
the country level and are thereby statistically similar 
to year dummies while carrying more meaningful 
information.
We apply two main estimation techniques. 
Our baseline estimation is performed using the 
within estimator, while we estimate the variance-
covariance-matrix of the remainder error term using 
the approach developed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). 
Therefore, standard errors are robust with respect to 
serial correlation within countries, cross-sectional 
correlation between countries as well as general 
heteroscedasticity. Our main robustness test is 
conducted using the first difference estimator. This 
has the additional advantage that potential non-
stationarity concerns are taken care of given that all 
our variables are unambiguously stationary in first 
differences. Since there is reason for concerns regarding 
the endogeneity for our measures of globalisation, and 
because the effect of other variables will most likely be 
manifested with a time lag, all explanatory variables 
enter the equation with a lag. It would be preferable 
to employ a General Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator to tackle the issue of endogeneity as well as 
the dynamic nature of distribution. However, due to the 
limited number of cross sections in our single country 
estimations this estimation method is not appropriate 
(Roodman 2009). Including our explanatory variables 
with a lag to mitigate biases arising from sequential 
exogeneity (predetermined variables) can be seen as a 
‘second best approach’ given our dataset (Wooldridge 
2002).
In addition to the pool of all sectors, separate 
regression analyses are performed for sector groups 
disaggregated as high skilled and low skilled sectors in 
manufacturing and services separately. This not only 
allows us to test the robustness of our results, but at 
the same time provides insights with regards to the 
variables that have potentially contrasting effects for 
manufacturing and services or across skill groups. 
However, since our cross sections are limited to a 
maximum of 21 sectors, specifications for individual 
skill groups can only provide indicative evidence.17 
We exclude the Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing, and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well as 
mostly publicly owned sectors (Public Administration 
and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; 
Human Health and Social Work Activities) from the 
17 The sectoral classification is based on the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC 3).
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reported estimations, as in these sectors wage setting 
behaviour may constitute an outlier and may not be 
determined by the same forces as other sectors. 
The estimation period differs due to data 
availability depending on the variables used in each 
specification and country. While the data for the wage 
share at a sectoral level is available for 1970–2011, the 
data for the FDI starts only in 1985 and detailed data 
on imports disaggregated as intermediate and final 
imports start in 1995. The estimation period for most 
countries for the specifications including intermediate 
import penetration is 1996-2010, while it is 1986–2010 
for specifications including FDI. Furthermore, data for 
our measures of financialisation starts in 1995 for most 
countries with the exception of France where data is 
available from 1970.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 3 presents a summary of our estimation results, 
while country-specific estimations are available upon 
request from the authors (see also Guschanski and 
Onaran 2016). The results reported in Table 3 provide 
a summary of over 40 different specifications for each 
variable, as we conduct separate specifications by skill-
group, manufacturing and service industries, as well as 
two different estimations methods (within- and first-
difference estimator). Therefore, they can only be seen 
as indicative.
Technology
We do not find a significant negative effect of ICT 
capital services on the wage share in France except 
for one specification when estimated using the within 
estimator only. The effect of ICT capital is even less 
robust for Germany where the variable is found to be 
positive or statistically insignificant in basically all 
specifications. The same applies to non-ICT capital 
services that exhibit a robust positive effect for the 
manufacturing sector pool. Similarly, capital intensity 
appears to be insignificant for most of the specifications 
for Britain ICT capital intensity appears to have a 
negative impact on the wage share in the United States, 
Italy and Spain. However, using sectors defined as high 
or low-skilled we fail to find evidence for the hypothesis 
that technological change will decrease the wage share 
of low-skilled labour and increase the wage share of 
high-skilled labour. Furthermore, in the United States 
and Spain the coefficient for ICT is statistically 
not different from zero when we include variables 
accounting for the effect of financialisation and 
migration. On the other hand, we find a robust positive 
impact of non-ICT capital in the United States, Italy 
and Spain, implying an elasticity of substitution that is 
smaller than one, which is in contrast to the finding for 
ICT capital intensity.
Bargaining Power
Our results regarding measures of bargaining power 
differ significantly across countries. We find robust 
positive effects of union density in Germany, mainly 
driven by the manufacturing sector. This is not 
surprising given the long tradition of sector-level wage 
negotiations in Germany. Similarly, we obtain a positive 
impact of union density in Italy and Spain. In France 
there is no robust effect of union density, and in fact 
the variable seems to have a perverse negative effect in 
some of the specifications using the within estimator. 
However, when we replace union density by adjusted 
collective bargaining coverage, we obtain a robust 
positive effect. Similarly, we obtain an insignificant 
coefficient for union density in Britain and the United 
States, while bargaining coverage appears to have a 
positive effect especially for manufacturing sectors in 
Britain and manufacturing as well as service sectors in 
the United States.
Table 3 
 
Summary of Estimation Results 
 Germany France Spain Italy UK US 
 Technology 
ICT 0 0 –* – 0 – 
non-ICT + 0 + + 0 + 
 Globalisation 
intermediate import penetration – – +* 0 0 – 
FDI –* 0 – 0 0 0 
Migration –* 0 0 +* + 0 
 Labour market institutions and social government expenditure  
Union density + 0 + + 0 0 
Bargaining coverage + + + + + + 
Government expenditure 0 + 0 + + +* 
 Financialisation 
Household debt 0 + 0 +* – – 
Financial payments 0 +* –* 0 – – 
Financial income – –* 0 0 + – 
Notes: Table 3 provides a summary of country-specific estimation results based on industry level data. ‘+’ indicates a statistically significant positive impact of the 
variable in column 1 on the wage share. ‘-’ indicates a statistically significant negative impact. ‘0’ indicates no statistically significant effect. The signs provide a summary 
of over 40 different specifications for each variable, therefore they can only be seen as indicative. ‘*’ indicates results that are robust only for a subset of the estimations, 
e.g. only for one particular estimation method or industry group. 
Source: Guschanski and Onaran (2016); all estimation results are available upon request from the authors. 
 
Table 3
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Social government spending has a statistically 
highly significant and robust positive coefficient 
for nearly all specifications in France and Italy, and 
is robust to the application of different estimation 
methodologies. The same holds for Britain although the 
results are not robust to estimations in first differences, 
and the United States where we find a positive impact 
if we reduce our sample to manufacturing sectors only, 
while we obtain a perverse negative sign for service 
sectors. For Germany and Spain, the effect is not robust 
to the application of different estimation methodo- 
logies and the coefficient is mostly statistically 
insignificant.18
We obtain mixed results regarding the effect of 
financialisation. In France household debt and financial 
payments have a perverse positive coefficient, while 
financial income has a negative effect. However, 
financial income and payments become insignificant 
for estimations in first differences. Similarly, we find a 
positive effect of household debt in Italy which is not 
robust to estimations in first differences. In Germany 
financial income appears to have the strongest 
negative effect on the wage share, while the negative 
coefficient of household debt is not robust. Similarly, 
we obtain a negative impact of financial payments in 
Spain, albeit only for estimations when applying the 
within estimator. However, in Britain, given the strong 
financial sector and the massive surge in household 
debt, financial payments and household debt both 
have a robust negative effect in all estimations using the 
within estimator, and the effect of financial payments 
is also robust when estimated in first differences. All 
financialisation variables have a negative impact on 
the wage share in the United States if the first difference 
estimator is applied. 
Globalisation
We find support for a negative effect of globalisation 
measured by intermediate import penetration in 
France, Germany and the United States, while in 
Britain the coefficient is still negative but rarely 
significant. In the United States and France, the 
negative effect of intermediate import penetration is 
mostly driven by low-skilled manufacturing sectors, 
while in Germany the effect is equally found in low as 
well as high skilled manufacturing sectors. However, 
it is not robust to estimations in first differences in 
the United States and Germany. We find a positive 
impact of intermediate import penetration in some 
specifications in Spain using the first difference 
estimator, although this result is not robust to 
estimations using the first-difference estimator and 
other robustness tests.
18 We have also experimented with an alternative measure of gov-
ernment spending: total social government spending comprising 
the sum of in-kind and in-cash social transfers as a ratio to GDP. Our 
results are largely robust to this alternative measure but given that 
data for cash benefits is available only from 1995 onwards we prefer 
our current measure comprising in-kind transfers only.
In France we obtain an insignificant effect of 
outward FDI in the pool with all sectors when the 
first difference estimator is used, however the effect 
is positive for manufacturing sectors and negative for 
service sectors (albeit insignificant).19 Similarly, there 
is no robust effect of outward FDI in first differences 
in Britain. This is in line with research by Herger and 
McCorriston (2014) suggesting a low share of vertical 
FDI in Britain and France. For Germany the impact of 
FDI does not appear to be robust for the pool of all 
sectors. However, the effect is negative and highly 
significant and doubles in size when we restrict our 
sample to manufacturing sectors only (first difference 
estimator), while it stays insignificant, albeit with a 
positive sign, if only service sectors are considered. 
Interestingly, we find a positive impact of outward FDI 
in the United States using the within estimator, driven 
by high-skilled manufacturing and service sectors 
alike, while the effect is negative for low skilled service 
sectors. However, the coefficient turns insignificant if 
the first difference estimator is applied. Furthermore, 
we obtain a highly robust negative impact of outward 
FDI in Spain. The impact of outward FDI turns out to be 
mostly statistically insignificant or not robust in Italy, 
especially applying the first difference estimator.
Our country-level measure of migration has a 
positive effect in Britain, which points to the fact 
that migrant workers are overall complementary to 
domestic workers, while there is a negative effect in 
Germany. However, the negative effect in Germany is 
not robust in all specifications, and according to the 
estimations in first differences, the negative migration 
effect seems to be driven by low skilled manufacturing 
sectors. In France, the effect of migration is insignificant 
in the total pool but is significantly positive in services; 
further disaggregation indicates that the positive 
effect in services is driven by high skilled services, 
whereas there is a negative effect in the low skilled 
manufacturing sectors. Turning to the other countries 
we find a positive effect of migration in Italy, clearly 
driven by manufacturing sectors, while there is no 
statistically significant effect in the United States or 
Spain. 
CONCLUSION
Our results provide evidence for the importance 
of country specific estimations. Our findings cast 
doubt on the technological change hypothesis as an 
explanation for the decline in the wage share common 
to all countries. While we found some evidence for a 
negative impact of ICT-capital intensity in the United 
States, Italy and Spain, the finding of a positive effect 
of non-ICT capital in these countries cast doubt on the 
prevalence of an elasticity of substitution larger than 
19 Our measure of FDI is the variable for which we are most con-
cerned about non-stationarity as our unit root test indicate inte-
gration of first order. Therefore, we mainly rely on the estimations 
in first differences for the analysis of outward FDI. For estimations 
using the within estimator we obtain a positive impact in France.
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one, which is a necessary condition for the technological 
change hypothesis. These doubts are substantiated 
by our finding that the effect of ICT capital intensity 
does not differ across high- and low-skilled sectors. 
Other countries show no robust effect of technological 
change on the wage share. This suggests that the effect 
of technology might be determined by the institutional 
environment in which production takes place, rather 
than by the elasticity of substitution.
The relevance of the institutional environment 
is further emphasised by our findings with respect 
to different measures of bargaining power. We 
confirm our hypothesis that union density is an 
important indicator of the bargaining power of 
labour in highly coordinated regimes (Germany, Italy 
and Spain), while collective bargaining coverage 
is more important in countries where firm-level 
bargaining dominates (France, the United States 
and Britain). This hypothesis can also be translated 
into an argument about different forms of bargaining 
power. The industrial relations literature relates the 
degree of coordination and bargaining coverage 
to the ‘institutional power’ of unions, while union 
density and fall-back options relate to ‘organisational 
and structural power’ (Wright 2000; Silver 2003; 
Brinkelmann and Nachtwey 2010; Bispinck et al. 2010). 
Our finding of an insignificant effect of union density 
in Britain, the United States and France implies that 
organisational power (union density) does not have 
an impact on the wage share unless it is backed up 
by institutional power as represented by a sufficient 
degree of coordination and bargaining coverage. With 
respect to other measures of bargaining power we 
find a positive impact of social government spending 
in France and Italy, and, less robust, for Britain and 
the United States, while there is no significant effect 
in Germany and Spain. This is in line with our finding 
that countries with a decentralised bargaining regime 
will benefit from policies at the national level, since 
gains that unions can achieve are often confined to a 
small work force.
Financialisation had the most pronounced effect 
in Britain and the United States, while there is also 
an effect in Germany. In Britain the most relevant 
channel appears to be shareholder value orientation 
that leads to wage suppression or increases in the 
mark up on production costs, as well as household 
indebtedness that reduces labour’s bargaining power. 
In Germany, and to some extent in France, increasing 
fall-back options of capital as captured by financial 
income appear to have a negative impact on the 
wage share. In the United States all three aspects of 
financialisation appear to be relevant. Estimations for 
other countries are inconclusive and require analysis 
using data on a more disaggregated level (Guschanski 
and Onaran 2018).
We find that globalisation had a strong impact 
on the wage share in all countries. The effect of 
globalisation on the wage share was least strong in 
Britain, which might indicate that market seeking 
rather than cost seeking FDI dominates in this country. 
In Germany the effect is due to outward FDI as well as 
intermediate import penetration which reflects the 
impact of international outsourcing practices and 
suggest that cost-seeking trade activities dominate. 
Intermediate imports penetration, had a positive (but 
not robust) impact in Spain, while FDI had a robust 
negative impact. FDI played a smaller role in France 
and the United States, while import penetration had 
a negative effect on the wage share in these countries.
Overall, our findings suggest that the decline 
in the wage share is not an inevitable outcome of 
technological change and globalisation. The lack of 
robustness regarding the effects of technology implies 
that an attempt to reduce income inequality through 
skill-upgrading alone will not be sufficient. Reversing 
the decline in the wage share requires an institutional 
framework in which the bargaining power of labour 
is more in balance with that of capital. Our findings 
suggest that it might not be enough to increase union 
density to achieve such a ‘level playing field’. Rather 
it requires a policy mix aiming at increasing the 
institutional power of unions via higher bargaining 
coverage and, potentially, coordination, as well as 
increasing the structural power of labour by improving 
labour’s fall-back options. This is particularly relevant 
for countries where firm-level bargaining dominates 
(Britain, the United States and to some extent France). 
The effect of financialisation can be altered by creating 
incentives to decrease short termism and dividend 
payments, e.g. through higher taxation of dividend 
payments and capital gains, and by prohibiting share 
buybacks. Decoupling executives’ remuneration 
from share prices and including representatives of 
employees and the wider public on company boards 
would further support this process (Lazonick 2014).
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